The XIV Amendment and Our Case - Part 2

The XIV Amendment and Our Case - Part 2

Report on how Bradwell v. Illinois limits the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment

This follow up article demonstrates Bradwell’s reaction and legal analysis of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion to Bradwell v. Illinois. After giving readers the chance to read both the Court’s majority and concurring opinion, Bradwell gives her analysis of the arguments. While she did not agree with the majority’s strict and narrow view of the Fourteenth Amendment to only protect black men, Bradwell respects the legal logic of the argument.
However, she then expresses her displeasure with Justice Bradley’s lack of adherence to the case and how he lectured on a woman's place in society.
Her eloquent legal analysis of the logical follies in this case pave a path for other women to challenge the courts for their rights that have been denied based on societal views.

Myra Bradwell

Chicago : Chicago Legal News Co., 1869-1925; Vol 5. no. 33, pg. 390

University of Minnesota - https://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d02617798t

May 10, 1873

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THE XIV AMENDMENT AND OUR CASE. We have heretofore published a tele graphic report of the opinion of a majo rity of the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, delivered by MIL LER, J., affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, refusing to grant us a license to practice law, upon the sole ground that we were a woman. We have since received an official copy of the opinion of the court, also the opi nion of BRADLEY, J., concurred in by FIELD, J., and an official notification that the late lamented CHIEF JUSTICE CHASE, for whose opinion we always had the greatest respect, dissented entirely from the opinion of the court. These opinions will be found elsewhere in this issue. Although we do not believe the construc tion of the XIV amendment, as given by a majority of the court, and their definition of the privileges and immuni ties of citizens of the United States are sound, we take great pleasure in saying that the opinion delivered by Judge MILLER is confined strictly to the points at issue, and is just such an one as might be expected from an able and expe rienced jurist entertaining the views that Judge MILLER does upon these con stitutional questions. He does not for a moment lower the dignity of the judge by traveling out of the record to give his individual views upon what we com monly term “Woman’s Rights.” We regard the opinion of Judge BRAD LEY as in conflict with his opinion de livered in what are known as the New Orleans Slaughter-house Cases, reported 3 CHICAGo LEGAL NEws, 17. In that case Judge BRADLEY said: “ There is no more sacred right of citizenship than the right to pursue unmolested a lawful employment in a lawful manner. It is nothing more or less than the sacred right of labor.” In speak ing of pursuits that required the granting of licenses, the judge said: “Public policy may require that these pursuits should be regulated and supervised by the local authorities in order to pro mote the public health, the public order and the general well being, but they are open to all proper ap plicants, and none are rejected except those who fail to exhibit the requisite qualifi cations.” * * * “All these systems of regulation are useful and entirely com petent to the governing power, and are not at all inconsistent with the great rights of LIBERTY of PURsUIT, which is one of the fundamental principles of a free government as well as one of the fundamental privileges of an American citizen.” If, as Judge BRADLEY says, the liberty of pursuit is one of the fundamen tal privileges of an American citizen, how can he then, and be consistent, de prive an American citizen of the right to follow any calling or profession under laws, rules and regulations that shall operate equally upon all, simply because such citizen is a woman? Our argument in the Supreme Court of Illinois, and the opinion of that court refusing the application, will be found in 2 CHICAGo LEGAL NEws, 145, and the able argument of our counsel, Hon. MATT H. CARPENTER, in the Supreme Court at Washington, in 4 CHICAGo LEGAL NEws, 108. #ttent #3 ublications. REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETER MINED IN THE SUPREME Court of JUDI CATURE of THE STATE of INDIANA, with Tables of the Cases Reported and Cases Cited and an Index. By James B. Black, Official Reporter. Volume XXXVI. Containing the cases de cided at the May Term, 1871, not pub lished in Vol. 35, and cases decided at the November Term, 1871. 1873. We acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the 36th from JAMEs B. BLACK, the reporter, who is his own publisher. The typographical execution is beautiful, and reflects creditably upon the Journal Company of Indianapolis, by whom it was printed. The cases are carefully re ported, the head-notes short, clear, and confined strictly to the points decided by the court. Mr. BLACK is, in every sense of the word, a model reporter. The opinions of the Supreme Court of Indiana are able, and a large number of the questions decided are of general interest to the profession outside of that State. A full set of these reports is avaluable addition to any law library.

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